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This paper presents an economic analysis of the evolution of religious and ethnic
characteristics in a model of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits which
occurs through family socialization and marital segregation decisions.
The model implies that the frequency of intragroup marriage (homogamy), as
well as the socialization rates of religious and ethnic groups, depends on the group’s
share of the population; minority groups search more intensely for homogamous
mates, and spend more resources to socialize their o¤spring.
We study the implications of the model regarding the e¤ect of the social match-
ing technology, divorce rates and the degree of cultural tolerance between groups
on the evolution of cultural traits.
Existing empirical evidence bearing directly and indirectly on the implications
of the model is discussed.
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11 Introduction
History contains several examples of the striking persistence of ethnic and religious traits.
Basques, Catalans, Corsicans, Irish Catholics, in Europe, and Quebecois in Canada, have
all remained strongly attached to their languages and cultural traits even through the
formation of political states which did not recognize their ethnic and religious diversity.
Jews of the diaspora have maintained a tenacious religious and ethnic identity resisting
many attempts at acculturation and even extermination. Many small ethnic and religious
enclaves are highly resilient. For example, small communities of Orthodox Christian
Albanians living in the south of Italy since they emigrated there in the 15th century,
maintained their language and religious faith. Similarly, small white communities in the
French Caribbean islands, ‘Blancs Matignons’, preserve themselves from racial mixing,
and have done so since the 18th century . Long-lived divisions along cultural and tribal
lines are still commonplace in modern Africa (McEvedy, 1996).
These and the many other examples of the persistence of cultural traits in history
should obviously not be interpreted as evidence that cultural traits are necessarily main-
tained against all odds. The rapid assimilation of Jews in Italy is a clear counter-example
(Della Pergola, 1972). But the persistence of cultural traits and the di¢culty of accul-
turating minorities does often take sociologists and anthropologists who study cultural
evolution by surprise. For instance, most sociological work on American Jews in the
50s and 60s predicted the ‘extinction’ of Jewish Orthodoxy, thereby failing to identify
the roots of the demographic ‘Renaissance’ that Orthodox Jewish culture in the U.S.
has been experiencing since the 70s (Mayer, 1979, Ch. 1). More generally, Claude
Levi Strauss (1997) has recently observed that the risks of cultural assimilation have
been much over-stated in the anthropological and sociological debate of the 50s, because
cultures have demonstrated a ‘very resilient strong core’. 1
The persistence of the evolution of ethnic and religious traits is mirrored in high and
persistent intragroup marriage (homogamy) rates, even for small ethnic and religious
groups. For instance, ethnic intermarriage was virtually unknown to immigrants in the
U.S. at the turn of the century. Pagnini-Morgan (1990), for instance estimate that Italian
and Polish immigrants around the beginning of the century in the U.S. were more than
2;000 times more likely to marry in their ethnic group than to inter-marry. They also
note low levels of inter-marriage persisting in second and third generation immigrants.
Religious homogamy is also very well documented for most religious groups (e.g., Sander,
1We can even read the political debate on assimilation in the United States as a reaction to the
persistence of cultural traits despite the e¤orts of the assimilation and Americanization movement born
in the beginning of the century to include immigrants, and o¤er of full participation. Facing growing
resistance to assimilation (religiously and even linguistically segregated parochial schools, for instance,
spread in this period; see Tyack, 1974), by the 20s the movement turned into an increasingly hostile
demand for immigrants’ acculturation to the English language and American culture (see Davis, 1920,
for a selection of early readings on assimilation). The heated debate over multi-cultural education has
continued and has recently taken a radical turn; see Glazer (1997).
21993, for Catholics, and Johnson, 1980, Schoen-Weinick, 1993, for other denominations).
In Section 2 we report in some detail on two ethnographic examples of populations which
adopt extreme strategies of marriage segregation to preserve speci…c cultural traits and
to socialize children: aristocrats in France and Orthodox Jews in New York.
The historical examples and evidence of cultural persistence and homogamy raise
important questions regarding cultural traits, particularly ethnic and religious traits,
their determinants in the short run and their long run distribution in the population.
This paper studies the evolution and persistence of cultural traits as dynamic proper-
ties of cultural transmission and socialization mechanisms. In particular, we concentrate
on segregation by marriage along ethnic and religious lines as a mechanism to favor
socialization at the family level.2
The model of socialization we develop and study is motivated by various stylized
facts which emerge from the sociological literature (see the next section). We model
cultural transmission as a mechanism which interacts socialization inside the family
and socialization outside the family in society at large via imitation and learning from
peers and role models. In the model, altruism motivates parents’ e¤orts to socialize
their children, and to transmit their own cultural traits. (Socialization e¤ort consists,
for instance, in the choice of neighborhood, school, or church attendance.) Families in
which parents have a homogeneous cultural trait are advantaged in the socialization
process for this trait, with respect to heterogamous families. Since each parent wishes
to transfer his own trait to his children, the choice of a mate in the marriage market
is functional to the desire to socialize the eventual children arising from such a union.
While then perfect assortative matching (complete homogamy) would arise optimally in
the absence of search costs, we model the marriage process as characterized by search
frictions. More speci…cally, we assume that both males and females can search for a mate
in some restricted pool where admission is costly, but where everybody who is admitted
has the same cultural trait (hence all marriages in the pool are homogamous).
We derive implications of such cultural transmission mechanisms in terms of di¤er-
ential behavior of cultural minorities and majorities with respect to their e¤ort to marry
homogamously and to socialize children to their own trait. We also study the dynam-
ics of the distribution of cultural traits in the population implied by such transmission
mechanisms, and the determinants of the long run stable distribution of traits, with the
objective of understanding the observed persistence of minority cultural traits. Some of
the results and the intuition behind them are summarized below.
2Cultural transmission, but with random mating and exogenous propensities for socialization, is
studied in biology; see e.g., Cavalli Sforza-Feldman (1981). The role of marriage as an institution of
transmission of cultural values has been stressed in anthropology, for instance by Boas (1928) and
Levi Strauss (1949). Economists have mostly concentrated instead on the agents’ choice of their own
preferences and values, as e.g., Becker (1996), Becker-Mulligan (1997), and, speci…cally for religious
preferences, Iannaccone (1990, 1998) . For genetic rathen than cultural transmission models, see e.g.,
Kockesen-Ok-Sethi (1997). We refer to Bowles (1998) for a survey and complete references.
3Minorities, other things equal, have more highly segregated marriage markets, and
exercise more e¤ort in directly socializing their children. They have, in fact, a stronger
incentive to segregate, to be homogamous and to socialize their children. Since the
population at large is mostly populated by majority types, a member of a minority
cultural group is likely to marry heterogamously if he does not structure his life so as
to meet mostly mates with the same traits (e.g., by going to the appropriate church,
living in the right neighborhood, etc.). Moreover, a minority type in an heterogamous
marriage will have di¢culty transmitting his own traits, since the spouse will favor a
di¤erent set of traits, and peers and role models will be taken from a population mostly
of the majority types.
Patterns of marital segregations and socialization across cultural groups also have
e¤ects on the evolution of cultural traits in society. We show that the cultural transmis-
sion mechanisms we study generate dynamics in the distribution of cultural traits which
tend to multicultural populations and away from complete assimilation of minorities.
Cultural minorities tend to react in equilibrium to the prospect of cultural assimilation
with marriage segregation, homogamous marriages, and with more intense strategies
for the direct socialization of children. Though majorities have higher homogamy and
socialization rates overall, it is the socialization e¤ort (which is higher for minorities)
to determine the transitional dynamics of the distribution of traits when one trait is
close to extinction. As a consequence, the fraction of the population of agents with
minority traits tends to increase, minority traits appear quite persistent, and long-run
multicultural populations are stable.
In other words, linear extrapolations of inter-marriage rates, socialization practices,
and demographic dynamics, tend to underestimate the persistence of cultural traits, be-
cause minorities react to their assimilation. The resilience of many ethnic and religious
neighborhoods in American cities, the increasing demand for multicultural education in
American society, as well as in many Western European countries, and the history of
many cultural communities such as American Orthodox Jews can however be explained
by the complex interaction of marriage segregation, direct cultural socialization of fam-
ilies, and children’s exposure to the cultural traits of the majority of the population at
large.
Our model of cultural transmission also allows us to study the dynamic e¤ects on
the composition of the population with respect to ethnic and religious traits of various
institutional arrangements within marriage. In particular we study the long-run e¤ects in
the dynamics due to structural changes i) in the availability of inter-cultural relationships
(due for instance to urbanization or information technologies), ii) in the freedom to
choose ones’ mate, and iii) in the organization of the family (divorce rates, single parent
families, female labor market participation).
We show that if the distribution of the population with respect to the cultural traits
is such that a majority and a minority trait are identi…able, then a higher availability of
4intercultural relationships causes agents to react with higher e¤orts at marriage segre-
gation and socialization of children. A negative direct e¤ect via random matching and
a positive indirect e¤ect due to the increase in the e¤ort to marry homogamously and
socialize counter each other in a¤ecting homogamy rates. The direct e¤ect on homogamy
rates tends to be stronger, and hence, homogamy decreases with easier intercultural re-
lationships. As the homogamy rates decrease, the probability of homogamous marriages
decreases for both groups but less rapidly for the majority group than for the minority
group. As a consequence, easier inter-cultural relationships increase, in the long-run, the
fraction of the population with the majority trait.
Greater freedom to choose ones’ mate, arguably a relatively recent historical trend
in many cultural populations, has similar e¤ects. By increasing the costs of marriage
segregation, segregation e¤ort and homogamy rates are decreased. Greater freedom of
mating choice increases, in the long-run, the fraction of the population with the majority
trait.
We also show that a higher probability of divorce reduces at the margin the value of
homogamous marriage, thereby decreasing homogamy rates in equilibrium. The proba-
bility of divorce reduces the resources spent to segregate in marriage and hence brings
more heterogamy in the short run. As in the case of easier intercultural relationships,
the probability of homogamous marriages decreases for both groups but less rapidly for
the majority group than for the minority group. Higher probabilities of divorce tend to
increase, in the long-run, the fraction of the population with the majority trait.
Similarly, changes in levels of tolerance between cultural groups a¤ect homogamy
rates and the persistence of cultural minorities. In particular, an increase in cultural tol-
erance between two groups induces less marital segregation and less family socialization
in the short-run tending to bias cultural evolution, in the long-run, towards the trait
of the majority group in society. (Greater tolerance on the part of the majority with
respect to intermarriage with minority populations generates a form of acculturation of
the minority.)3
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2.1, we introduce various stylized
facts on cultural transmission and socialization which motivate our modelling. In Section
2.2 we analyze the implications of the basic model of marriage and cultural transmission,
provide some extensions, and perform some comparative statics. Section 2.3. introduces
some empirical evidence on homogamy, socialization practices, and segregation and di-
vorce, o¤ering support for the implications of our model with respect to the transmission
of ethnic and religious traits. Finally, Section 3 studies the dynamics of the distribution
of traits in the population and derives several comparative dynamic implications.
3The greater tolerance of intermarriage with Jews after World War II in the U.S. might be the cause
of the trend toward acculturation of Jews, as noted by several contributors in the current debate on the
‘Jewish identity’ in the U.S.; see Dershowitz (1997).
52 Marriage and socialization
Various stylized facts on marriages as cultural transmission mechanisms can be collected
from an analysis of the empirical literature in sociology and social psychology.
1. Cultural traits are usually adopted in the early formative years of children’s
psychology. Family, peers and role models play a crucial role in the adoption of cultural
traits. This has been extensively documented for religious and ethnic traits, for instance,
by Clark-Worthington (1987), Cornwall (1988), De Vaus (1983), Erickson (1992), Hayes-
Pittelkow (1993).4
2. Families care about their children’s cultural traits and consciously exercise e¤ort
in an attempt to socialize children. Also, homogamous families (i.e., families in which
parents have homogeneous cultural traits) predominantly favor the transmission of their
own traits. Psychological studies of heterogamous couples consistently report their con-
cern about the possible cultural attitudes of children when deciding to form a family
(see Rosenblatt et al., 1995, for racial traits, and Mayer, 1985, Smith, 1996, for ethnic
and religious traits). Gussin Paley (1995) provides a vivid ethnographic documentation
of school choice of middle-class African-American parents in Chicago’s South Side. The
main issue in the choice consists in trading o¤ the low academic quality of the predom-
inantly black public schools and the exposure to ‘white culture’ in integrated schools.
O’Brien-Fugita (1991) document the perceived importance for Japanese families of the
development of Japanese schools after World War II in the U.S. (often contrary to the
preferences of their children). Similar attitudes are documented for many ethnic groups
(e.g., Mayer, 1985, for Jews, and Tyack, 1974, for Germans, and, more recently, Glazer,
1997, for African-Americans).
3. The e¤ectiveness of family socialization depends strongly on parental agree-
ment on the trait to be transmitted. Children of mixed religious marriages have weaker
religious commitments than those of religiously homogamous marriages (Hoge-Petrillo,
1978), and Ozorak, 1989). Also, children of mixed religious marriages are less likely to
conform to any parental religious ideologies, and to practices such as church attendance,
or prescribed fertility behavior (Heaton, 1986, Hoge-Petrillo-Smith, 1982, and Ozorak,
1989).
These facts motivate our model of socialization. In particular, we model cultural
transmission as a mechanism which interacts socialization inside the family with social-
ization outside the family, in society at large. (Socialization inside the family isalso called
‘direct vertical’ socialization, while socialization by society, which occurs via imitation
and learning from peers and role models, is also called ‘oblique’ socialization.)5
4The transmission of traits which are formed later in the psychological developement of children,
though, is often dominated by the role of peers; see e.g., East-Felice-Morgan (1993) for evidence on the
transmission of attitudes toward sexual behavior.
5This terminology is taken from Cavalli Sforza-Feldman (1981).
6We model direct vertical socialization through parents having altruistic attitudes
towards their children. Altruism motivates parents to exert e¤ort to socialize their
children, and to transmit their own cultural traits. An important assumption we make
in this respect is that parents wish to transmit their own trait, and do not just internalize
their children’s preferences or some measure of their success. Indirect evidence for such
‘paternalistic altruism’ comes, as already noted, from studies of parental school choice
decisions. Also, an analysis of norms regarding inter-religious marriages reveals that
parents of most major denominations (from Catholics to Baptists and Jews; but also
for instance Seventh-Day Adventists and Lutherans) at least tend to warn children not
to inter-marry, justifying their position with a concern about the religious education
of grand-children (Smith, 1996)6. Some evidence in support of ‘paternalistic altruism’
can also be derived from socio-economic surveys. For instance, in response to NORC’s
General Social Survey’s question, ‘Which three of the qualities listed would you say are
the most desirable for a child to have ?’, ‘obedience’ is cited on average across the sample
more than, (in order) ‘self-control’, ‘success’, ‘studiousness’, ‘cleanliness’, and less only
than ‘honesty’.7 8
This assumption of parents’ paternalistic attitudes is consistent with our modelling
of cultural traits as ‘pure’ traits, with no direct economic e¤ect. For instance, we implic-
itly assume that agents’ economic opportunities, e.g., their expected present discounted
income or their human capital accumulation costs, are independent of their trait. This
is, of course, an abstraction meant to disentangle the cultural transmission mechanism
from other economic considerations. Ethnic and religious traits, more than other cultural
traits and attitudes, seem to approximate satisfactorily ‘pure’ traits.9
We …nally assume that families in which parents have a homogeneous cultural trait
are advantaged in the socialization process for this trait, with respect to heterogamous
families. Since each parent wishes to transfer his own trait to his children, the choice
of a mate in the marriage market is functional to the desire to socialize the eventual
children from such a union. While assortative matching would arise then at equilibrium
in the absence of search costs (see Becker, 1973, 1974), we model the marriage process
6For example, the 1983 Code of Canon law for the Catholic Church says: ” Without the express
permission of the competent authority, marriage is forbidden between two baptized persons, one of
whom was baptized in the Catholic Church...and the other of whom is a member of a Church... which is
not in full communion with the Catholic Church ” (801). Moreover, the permission cannot be granted
unless the following condition is full…lled: ”the Catholic party declares that he or she is prepared to
remove dangers of falling away from the faith and makes a sincere promise to do all in his or her power
to have all children baptized and brought up in the Catholic Church”.
7A similar pattern of answers is reported to a similar question in the National Survey of Families
and Households.
8For a natural selection explanation of paternalistic forms of altruism, see Bisin-Verdier (1998).
9However, some evidence on the e¤ect of religious and ethnic traits on economic opportunities is
found in Warren (1970) and Sowell (1994). A …rst analysis of these e¤ects of traits can be found in
Bisin-Verdier (1996).
7as characterized by search frictions. More speci…cally, we assume that while both males
and females can search for a mate in some restricted pool where everyone admitted has
the same cultural trait (hence all marriages in the pool are homogamous), admission to
the pool is costly. (We think of direct admission costs, but also of the costs in terms of
other unmodelled desirable characteristics of the match, which derive from constraining
oneself to search in a restricted pool.)
Many di¤erent institutions do function at least partially as marriage pools restricted
along cultural traits. For instance Kwon (1997) documents the centrality of the Ko-
rean Ethnic Church in Houston as a mechanism for cultural identity and as a network
of contacts among …rst and second immigration Korean immigrants. A similar picture
regarding local catholic churches is drawn by Matovina (1995) for the Spanish-speaking
population in San Antonio, Texas, between 1821 to 1860. To better illustrate our analy-
sis of the marriage process as a mechanism for transmission of cultural traits, and in
particular to isolate the institutions which may function as restricted marriage pools, we
consider two examples of populations with rather extreme socialization practices: aris-
tocrats in France and Orthodox Jews in New York.
The Bottin Mondain and the Rallye. Various ethnographic studies of aristocrats have
revealed the importance of their attachment to speci…c cultural values and their con-
cern for the inter-generational transmission of their symbolic and cultural capital such
as family names, negative attitudes towards work and money, and the importance of
land property (Grange (1996), Mension-Rigau (1993), Pincon-Pincon Charlot (1989), de
Saint Martin (1993)).
But how are these values transmitted ? In France the most relevant institutions with
this purpose are the Bottin Mondain, the main aristocracy’s listing book, and the Rallye,
a chain of dancing parties (Grange, 1996).
Families can be listed in the Bottin only if invited by families already listed. Most
information published in the Bottin Mundain is family and dynastic oriented, and pro-
fessional indications are kept to a strict minimum. 10 The Rallye, which organizes a
gathering of between 100 and 500 young people each month, consists instead of a group
of young single women, whose families are listed in the Bottin Mondain. The family
of each woman, when subscribing to the Rallye, commits to host a party for all the
participants of the Rallye.
Along with the Bottin Mondain, the Rallye is therefore an institution intended to
stimulate homogamous aristocratic mating. It involves substantial resources spent by the
di¤erent families (parties are generally organized in sumptuous palaces), and well re‡ects
our vision of a restricted pool in which resources are spent to increase the probability of
being married homogamously with respect to the relevant cultural trait.
From a survey of 3914 nuclear families in the Bottin Mondain during the period 1903-
10Dates of birth are not mentioned except for minor children, which is useful if the book is to be used
as a marriage pool.
81987, Arrondel-Grange (1993) estimate the probability of homogamous marriage for a
child of a family in the Bottin Mondain. They …nd a signi…cant rate of homogamy well
above that implied by random matching. The average probability of being married with
someone of the Bottin Mondain for a daughter of a couple listed in the Bottin is 44% (in
the period 1950-1969) and 39% (in the period 1970-1983). For young males the average
estimated probability in either periods is 39%. When the two parents share important
aristocratic attributes (e.g., old aristocracy, a family castle, or membership in an aris-
tocratic club), this probability is over 65% for young females, and over 80% for young
males.
The Shadchan. Orthodox Jews live in mostly segregated neighborhoods and adhere to
very extreme norms to preserve their religious and cultural traits (see the ethnographic
studies of Heilman, 1995, and Mayer, 1979). In a religious community whose various pro-
scriptions limit casual encounter between the sexes, many marriages are arranged. The
ethnographic study of Orthodox Jews in Boro Park, an Orthodox Jewish neighborhood
in Brooklyn, New York, conducted by Mayer (1979) in the 70s, surveys match-makers
(shadchans). This study reveals that not only do shadchans serve as go-betweens (‘tele-
phone numbers’ distributors’), but most importantly they also inform both parties of
each other’s adherence to religious norms, prescriptions and proscriptions (e.g., about
the dress code of the woman, the tenure at the rabbinical seminary of the man, etc.).
Essentially, the role of the shadchan in guaranteeing the preservation of religious and
cultural traits in marriage is preserved, even if its historical role in protecting and match-
ing families’ assets has lost much of its importance and is not any more an integral part
of the traditional marriage system.
As important as match-making is (as a restricted marriage pool) in Orthodox Jew-
ish communities, ‘love-marriages’ are slowly replacing arranged ones. Nonetheless, for
instance in Boro Park, many institutions, from kosher pizza parlors and cafeterias of the
hundreds of the Yeshivas (religious schools) in the neighborhood, to Orthodox summer
camps, and Young Men’s & Women’s Hebrew Association’s co-ed activities, operate to
substitute the shadchan in facilitating mating by religious and cultural traits (see again
Mayer, 1979).
The institutions of arranged marriages, segregated living arrangements, segregated
education in religious school, and the creation of restricted marriage pools like summer
camps, has been exceptionally e¤ective in promoting homogamy for Orthodox Jews.
According to the National Jews Population Survey, the intermarriage rate in 1990 for
Orthodox Jews was only 3%, as opposed to 37% for Conservative Jews and 53% for
Reform Jews.
The pattern of homogamy and segregation observed for French aristocrats and Ortho-
dox Jews, while extreme, is certainly not unique. Baker (1979), for instance, documents
similar rates of homogamy for a community of Upper Silesian farmers living in segregated
neighborhoods around an ethnic catholic parish in Texas, from 1850 to 1920. Homogamy
9rates in this community are still very high, at around 50%.
2.1 The Analysis
Suppose there are two possible types, fa;bg, of cultural traits in the population. In
particular, di¤erent traits might capture some aspect of ethnic traits or religious beliefs.
In each period there are two stationary, equally sized populations of adult males and
females. Agents live two periods. Young agents are born without well de…ned cultural
traits, which they acquire (in a way described below) before becoming adult. In his adult
life, a male gets matched with an adult female (in a way to be described below) to form
a household. In order to maintain the size of each population stationary, we assume that
each family union has two children, a male and a female.
Parents are altruistic towards their children and want to socialize them to their own
speci…c cultural model. Let V ij denote the utility a type i parent derives from a type j
child (i 2 fa;bg). We assume then V ii > V ij (and V jj > V ji).11
The socialization process is modelled as follows. The fraction of individuals with
trait i in the population is denoted qi. All ‘naive’ children, without de…ned preferences
or cultural traits, living in a family in which both parents have the same trait, are …rst
exposed to their family trait, say i. ‘Direct vertical’ socialization to trait i occurs with
probability ¿i. We impose the extreme assumption that only families in which both
parents have the same trait can vertically socialize their children. Children in families
with a ‘mixed’ trait pick the trait of a role model chosen at random in the population
(i.e., they pick trait i with probability qi and trait j with probability qj = 1 ¡ qi).
Similarly if a child from a family with, say, trait i is not directly socialized, which
occurs with probability 1 ¡ ¿i, he picks the trait of a role model chosen randomly in
the population. Finally, socialization is costly. Socialization costs increase with the
probability of successful direct socialization by parents, and are denoted H(¯¿i), for i 2
fa;bg (¯ is just a parameter which we shall use in the comparative statics exercises). The
marriage choice, then, has a crucial e¤ect on the socialization technology available, and
agents, choosing the best mate to socialize children, aspire for homogamy in marriage.
11Suppose agents choose when adult some abstract action x in some set X. Children with preferences
of type j, uj(x), then will, in general, make a di¤erent choice than parents of type i would, and viceversa.
Altruistic parents will necessarily prefer children with their own type of preferences when evaluating
their children’s choices with their own (the parents’) utility function. Formally:
V ij = ui(xj); where xj = argmaxx2X uj(x)
and hence typically V ii > V ij (symmetrically for trait j). It is important to notice, though, that if the
choice set X depends on the preference type, and for instance is larger for agents of type i (e.g. because
type i agents are favored in the labour markets), then parents of type j might want to socialize their
children to the opposite type i. By assuming that V ii > V ij, as already mentioned, we e¤ectively restrict
the relevance of our analysis to ‘pure’ cultural traits which have no e¤ect on the objective economic
success of the agents.
10We model marriage choice in what follows (we set the notation for the general agent
i 2 fa;bg).
Matching of adult individuals is organized via a marriage game. The probability of
entering an homogamous marriage is endogenously chosen by each agent. More precisely,
we assume there are two restricted marriage matching pools (one for each cultural trait)
where individuals with the same trait can possibly match in marriage. With probability
®i an agent of type i enters the restricted pool and is married homogamously. With
probability 1¡®i an agent of type i does not get married in the restricted pool. He then
enters a common pool made of all individuals who have not been matched in marriage in
their own restricted pools. In this common pool individuals match randomly. If Ai is the
fraction of individuals of type i who are matched in their restricted pool (in equilibrium,
by symmetry, all individuals with the same trait behave identically and hence ®i = Ai)
the probability an individual of type i in the common unrestricted marriage pool is
matched in marriage with an individual of the same type is then
(1¡Ai)qi
(1¡Ai)qi+(1¡Aj)(1¡qi);








i + (1 ¡ ®
i)
(1 ¡ Ai)qi
(1 ¡ Ai)qi + (1 ¡ Aj)(1 ¡ qi)
(1)
We assume that individuals of type i can a¤ect the probability of being matched in
their restricted pool by choosing ®i at a cost C(±®i), where ± is just a parameter which
we will use in the comparative statics exercises. The typical problem of a male of type
i will be to choose the probability of matching in the restricted marriage pool knowing
that, if he is matched in an homogamous household, he has access to a technology to




















where qiV ii + (1 ¡ qi)V ij represents the expected utility of a type i parent in an het-
erogamous marriage (in which the socialization of the children is determined by random
matching only); while W i(qi) represents the corresponding expected utility in an homog-
amous marriage. Since homogamous marriages are endowed with a direct socialization
technology, W i(qi
t) depends on the parents’ choice of socialization e¤ort, ¿i, as well as
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Note that agents i and j interact non-trivially in the marriage game: agent’s i max-
imization problem depends (via ¼i(:)) on Aj, the fraction of agents of type j in the
restricted pool. In fact the more agents of type j in the restricted pool, the less of them
in the residual population, and the more favorable for agents of type i the strategy of
not entering their own restricted pool (and being matched in the common residual pool).
11A symmetric Nash equilibrium of the marriage game is then represented by mappings
®i(qi) which are …xed points of the best replies of agents i 2 fa;bg derived from the
maximization of equation (2). The probability of homogamous marriage for agents of
type i is then in equilibrium just function of qi, and is denoted ¼i(qi).
Proposition 1 Under convexity and regularity assumptions on costs C(±®i) and H(¯¿i)
(explicitely stated in the appendix),
There exist a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the marriage game, denoted [®(qi)] =
[®i(qi)]i2fa;bg; moreover, ®(qi) is a continuous mapping.
The solution of the socialization e¤ort choice of homogamous families, i.e. of the max-
imization in equation (3), denoted [¿i(qi)]i2fa;bg, is a continuous mapping.
2.2 Implications
In this section we study several implication of the marriage and socialization model
for a given distribution of traits in the population, qi. The implied dynamics of the
distribution of traits is studied in the next section.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium probability of matching in the restricted pool, ®i(qi),
and the equilibrium socialization e¤ort of homogamous families, ¿i(qi), are decreasing in
qi, for i 2 fa;bg.
The probability of matching in the restricted pool and the choice of socialization e¤ort
of homogamous families are higher for minorities, other things equal.12 Minorities have
a stronger incentive to segregate, to be homogamous, and to socialize children. In fact,
an individual in a cultural minority has a large probability of making an heterogamous
marriage if he does not enter the restricted pool, since the common unrestricted pool
would be mostly populated by majority types. Moreover, a minority type in an heterog-
amous marriage will not have access to the technology of socialization and his children
will be socialized to the external cultural environment, that is, with large probability,
the majority trait. This motivates agents with minority traits to homogamy. Once ho-
mogamous, families with a minority trait still have large incentives to directly socialize
their children because if direct socialization is unsuccessful, once again, children will be
socialized to the external cultural environment, i.e. most probably to the majority trait.
12It is important to stress that this cross-sectional interpretation of Proposition 2 requires cultural
traits not too much di¤erent in terms of tolerance to each other, i.e. in terms of V ii ¡V ij = ¢V i; i 2
fa;bg. Moreover, the identi…cation of cultural minorities and majorities is only possible if the dynamics
of the distribution of cultural traits is not at its stationary state, since otherwise the population will
tend to be evenly distributed across cultural traits; see Section 3. The cross-sectional interpretation is
central to our analysis because most of the empirical evidence available on marriage and socialization
is in fact cross-sectional; see Section 2.3.
12It isalsoeasily shown that for any given distribution of traits, qi, both ®i(qi) and ¿i(qi)
are decreasing in socialization costs, ¯, and increasing in the gain from socialization,
V ii¡V ij = ¢V i. Also, ®i is decreasing in (while ¿i is una¤ected by) marriage segregation
costs, parametrized by ±. A positive change in the cost of direct socialization, not
surprisingly, negatively a¤ects direct socialization e¤ort, but it also negatively a¤ects
entry to the restricted marriage pool since the bene…ts of the restricted pool consist in
the option to use the direct socialization technology, which is now more costly. In the
same way, higher gains from socialization positively a¤ect both direct socialization e¤ort
and entry into the restricted marriage pool, while higher marriage segregation costs ±
negatively a¤ect marriage segregation, without having any e¤ect on family socialization,
which is possible only for homogamous families.














[1 ¡ ®i(qi)]qi + [1 ¡ ®j(1 ¡ qi)](1 ¡ qi)
(4)
How do homogamy rates depend on the composition of the population ? Homogamy rates
of minority populations re‡ect the trade-o¤ of stronger marriage segregation strategies
(®i(qi) is decreasing in qi by Proposition 2) with the adverse e¤ect due to their higher
intercultural matching in the common pool, where matching is random and hence re‡ects
relative population sizes. As a consequence, the dependence of ¼i on qi is not monotonic.
It can be shown that, if population i is intolerant enough (i.e. for high enough ¢V i), its
homogamy rate …rst decreases and then increases in qi. Minority populations hence will
tend to have homogamy rates inversely related to their share in the whole population.
Socialization rates, as measured by the probability of an homogamous family with
trait i of having a child of the same trait, Pii = ¿i(qi)+(1¡¿i(qi))qi, also do not depend
monotonically on qi. It is easy to show that, as with the homogamy rate, the socialization
rate of group i …rst decreases and then increases in qi, if ¢V i is large enough.
2.2.1 Extensions
The marriage model just introduced can be extended in various directions with the ob-
jective of deriving richer empirical implications. We summarily report here on some
extensions we pursued. (The complete analysis is reported in an Appendix available
from the authors upon request.)
Suppose afraction of the population, the same acrossgender and cultural type, cannot
(or does not want to) have children. We assume, for simplicity, that such agents form a
marriage pool by themselves. Since the only advantage of homogamy in our set-up lies
in the technology of children’s socialization, they have in fact no interest in homogamy
along the cultural trait dimension. In such a model, the di¤erential homogamy of families








where [qi]2 is the probability of homogamy for an agent with trait i if he cannot have
children, calculated from pure random matching.
It can be shown that such homogamy di¤erential, ¢HMi(qi), is positive in equilib-
rium.
Suppose marriage in the common pool is biased in favor of homogamous matching.
For instance, the bias could arise from segregated neighborhoods in the population, or
from the existence of institutions which function as restricted marriage pools and whose
entry is free. We write the probability of an individual of type i being matched in







i + (1 ¡ ®
i)
(1 ¡ Ai)qi + (1 ¡ Aj)(1 ¡ qi)°
(1 ¡ Ai)qi + (1 ¡ Aj)(1 ¡ qi)
(5)
where the second term on the right-hand-side of (5) represents the fraction of type i
individuals homogamously matched in the common residual marriage pool, given that
there is a biased matching process parametrized by ° 2 [0;1]. When ° = 0; there is
random matching in the common pool. When ° = 1; individuals match with prob-
ability 1 to someone of the same type in the common pool: there is perfect assorta-
tive matching for each community independent of the existence of restricted pools (i.e.
¼i(®i;Ai;Aj;qi;1) = 1 for any ®i).
For this extension of the marriage model, comparative statics exercises show that ®i
is decreasing in °. An increase in segregation of the population outside of the restricted
pool, (i.e., a positive change in °), reduces the incentives for agents to enter the re-
stricted pool. The e¤ect on homogamy rates is, on the other hand, ambiguous, because
the chgange in ° has also a direct e¤ect on homogamy rates (homogamous marriages by
random matching are now easier). Under some weak conditions (detailed in the Appen-
dix), it can be shown that the direct e¤ect on homogamy rates is stronger, and hence
that a positive change in ° has a positive e¤ect on equilibrium homogamy rates.13
The last extension we consider involves adding an exogenous probability of divorce.
Suppose each family has a probability c of separating. We assume separation occurs
after children are born, but before they are socialized to the cultural traits. If separation
occurs, we assume that one of the parents is chosen randomly to form a single parent
family. We also assume that socialization is more costly for single parent families (see
13Obviously ° has no e¤ect on ¿i and ¼i. It can also be shown that ¢HMi decreases with °.
A similar analysis, with qualitatively similar comparative statics results, can be carried over for
distortions which favor the parents’ trait in the oblique phase of socialization.
14Thomson-McLanahan-Curtin, 1992, for some evidence on this point). Note that single
parent families, as opposed to heterogamous families, have a technology to socialize
children; no ambiguity on which trait to transmit arises in this case.




























s(qi), and W i
h(qi) denote, respectively, the gains from socializing chil-
dren inside an homogamous marriage, a single parent family, and an heterogamous mar-
riage. Given our assumptions about the socialization technologies of the di¤erent family
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with Hm(¯¿i) and Hs(¯¿i) being the socialization cost functions of homogamous couples
and single parent family. We assume Hm(¯¿i) < Hs(¯¿i), for all ¿i 2 (0;1).
The solution to the socialization problems provides socialization e¤orts for homoga-
mous parents, ¿i
m(qi), and single parent families, ¿i
s(qi), with the property that ¿i
m(qi) >
¿i
s(qi); homogamous families have a better direct socialization technology than single
parent families, and hence in equilibrium they actually do socialize their children more
intensely. Comparative statics exercises show that higher divorce rates in equilibrium
imply lower segregation rates in restricted marriage pools, lower homogamy rates, and
lower di¤erentials in homogamy with respect to agents who cannot have children. When
looking for a mate, agents anticipate that the marriage might fail. The value of the
homogamy in marriage is then reduced, because, if the marriage ends, children will be
socialized with a relatively ine¢cient technology. Agents’ incentives to enter the re-
stricted marriage pool, i.e., to look for an homogamous mate, are lower the higher the
probability of divorce, c.
2.3 Evidence
This section collects some of the existing empirical evidence, mostly drawn from the
sociological literature, on the implications of the model regarding homogamy and social-
ization with respect to ethnic and religious traits.
2.3.1 Homogamy
High rates of homogamy along cultural dimensions and positive di¤erentials in ho-
mogamy with respect to families which cannot have children are certainly a fact, at
15least along the religious and the ethnic dimensions. The homogamy of new immigrants
in the U.S. at the turn of the century was ‘almost castelike’, and quite persistent over
successive generations. High rates of homogamy by ethnic group are more generally
documented by Peach (1980). The examples of French aristocrats, Orthodox Jews, and
Upper Silesian farmers reported in Section 2 also support these observations. Religious
homogamy is also pervasive (see Sander, 1993, for Catholics, and Johnson, 1980, Schoen-
Weinick, 1993, for other denominations).14 Homogamy rates well above those implied by
random matching, of course, might well have many explanations other than the desire
to preserve one or several cultural traits in children. Measures of psychological costs of
religious intermarriage are quite low, both in terms of costs borne by spouses (e.g., mar-
ital instability; see Lehrer-Chiswick, 1993, Heaton, 1994) and by children (e.g., anomie,
lack of self-esteem; see Aellen-Lambert, 1969, Johnson-Nagoshi, 1986, Stephan-Stephan,
1991), thereby supporting the argument that the socialization of children is an important
determinant of the observed religious homogamy.
The marriage model we have developed more speci…cally implies that homogamy
rates should be higher for families which expect to have children. In particular, ho-
mogamy rates should be higher in marriage unions than in cohabitations, since fertility
expectations of cohabiters are not statistically di¤erent from those of single individuals,
as documented by Rindfuss-VandenHeuvel (1990). Consistently, 51% of marriages in the
National Survey of Families and Households (1987-88) are religiously homogamous, com-
pared to only 37% of cohabitations (Schoen-Weinick, 1993). Relatedly, Lehrer (1996)
reports higher intended fertility for religiously homogamous couples.
Our model of cultural transmission has its most important class of implications for
the behavior of minorities. Minorities, other things equal, should exercise more e¤ort
in marriage segregation. While e¤ort in marriage segregation is di¢cult to measure
directly, populations with minority traits, such as Orthodox Jews or Amish, seem to
segregate more intensely and to develop institutions for segregated marriages. Even for
apopulation with lessextreme homogamy patterns, Japanese-Americans, O’Brien-Fugita
(1991) report that cultural and ethnic institutions and clubs (which we would interpret
as restricted marriage pools) are most prevalent in areas where Japanese-American are
minorities.
Formal evidence on homogamy rates for religious traits has been reported and studied
by Johnson (1980). Using data from the pooled 1973-76 NORC General Social Survey,
the 1960 Growth of Families Survey, and other sources, Johnson (1980) constructs mar-
riage tables for six religious groups.15 He then estimates a log-linear model of marriage
14Indirect evidence for the perceived importance of religious homogamy in marriage decisions comes
from the study of conversions: both Warren (1970) and Greeley (1979) found that most religious iden-
ti…cation changes were attributable to the conversions of spouses to estabilish homogamy in religiously
heterogamous marriages.
15The main denominations in each of the six groups are: Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Luther-
ans, Catholics, and Others.
16frequencies for each religious group to …t the marriage tables, identifying two main ex-
planatory factors in the analysis of assortative marriage: the religious composition of
the population, and the ‘intrinsic endogamy’ of each religious group, where ‘intrinsic
endogamy’ is a measure of the group’s e¤ort in marriage segregation, i.e., a measure of
®i in our notation. Both the estimates of the model relative to the national and the re-
gional level (i.e., relative to the national or the regional composition of the population by
religious group), show that the intrinsic homogamy coe¢cients are generally higher for
the groups which comprise a smaller proportion of the population, as our results imply.
At the national level, for instance, the smallest group, ‘Others’ (the residual group), has
the highest intrinsic homogamy, while the largest groups, Baptists and Catholics, have
the lowest. At the regional level, also, the smallest intrinsic homogamy for Catholics is
in the North-East, where Catholics comprise more than 45% of the population, while
the largest (more than three times as large) is in the South, where Catholics constitute
only 10% of the population.
2.3.2 Socialization and socialization e¤ort
Socialization to trait i in the model depends positively on socialization e¤ort, ¿i, and on
the share of the population with trait i, qi. Moreover, since we assumed heterogamous
families are not endowed with a socialization technology, homogamy should proxy for
socialization e¤ort, ¿i. Consistently with these implications of our analysis, there is
evidence that successful socialization occurs more frequently in homogamous families
(Hayes-Pittelkow, 1993, Heaton, 1986, Hoge-Petrillo, 1978, Hoge-Petrillo-Smith, 1982,
Ozorak, 1989). Also, Mayer (1985) constructed a survey of mixed Jewish-Christian
marriages in 1983, comparing several measures of socialization success of conversionary
marriages (in which the Christian spouse converted to Judaism at marriage) to the
same measures for heterogamous marriages. He estimates that children of conversionary
marriages are more than three times as likely to identify themselves as Jews than children
of heterogamous marriages.
More importantly, in their study of religious belief in Australia, Hayes-Pittelkow (1993)
…nd that the e¤ect of homogamy on socialization vanishes when a measure of socialization
e¤ort (e.g., ‘parental discussion of religious beliefs’) is introduced in the regression. This
is consistent with our model’s implication that homogamy a¤ects socialization only as a
proxy for higher socialization e¤ort.
In term of direct socialization e¤ort, our model implies that homogamous families
exercise more e¤ort on children socialization (because they have a better technology
to this e¤ect), and families with minority cultural traits exercise higher socialization
e¤orts, coeteris paribus. The presence of higher socialization e¤ort for homogamous
families with children is suggested by the analysis of the survey panel constructed by
Thornton-Axinn-Hill (1992) on Detroit families between 1962 and 1980. Married families
in the panel engage more in religious activities (proxying for religious socialization), after
17conditioning for religiosity at the moment in which the family is formed, than families
in cohabitation (as already noted, cohabitations are much less fertile and much more
heterogamous that marriages).
Direct evidence for the socialization behavior of minorities is rather scarce. Barber
(1994), however, does document that black and Hispanic families more aggressively so-
cialize their children: they both have higher standards for behavior and are better able
to enforce those standard.
Other interesting evidence on socialization e¤ort can be obtained by analyzing neigh-
borhood segregation by ethnic and religious group, insofar as neighborhood segregation
is endogenously determined partly by the desire to socialize o¤spring. Ethnic neighbor-
hoods have been a dominant aspect of American society since its early history, especially
since the mass migrations to the U.S. in the last century. As early as 1703, for instance
New York streets were identi…ed as either Dutch or British (Homberger, 1994). Also,
extreme residential segregation by ethnicity of turn of the century immigrants is well
documented, e.g., by Duncan-Lieberson (1959), Peach (1980). While adjustment cost
explanations are also consistent with high segregation levels along ethnic lines of …rst
generation migrants, such explanations can hardly be extended, in our opinion, to sig-
ni…cant levels of ethnic segregation of neighborhoods which persist after the second and
third generations. In this respect, using 1970 Census Data, Borjas (1995) estimates that
the probability that a second generation ethnic family group lives near family groups
of the same ethnic origin is much higher than one would expect if families were spread
across neighborhoods independently of their ethnic origin. For instance, among second
generation workers, the typical family of Polish ancestry lives in a neighborhood that is
7:8% Polish, even though …rst and second generation Polish make up only 1:7% of the
population. Similarly, second generation Italians live in 12:1% Italian neighborhoods,
even though Italians …rst and second generation immigrants account for only 2:8% of
the population.16 Moreover, according to Borjas (1995), high segregation rates persist
for third generation immigrants, and there is little evidence that only economically dis-
advantaged groups are geographically segregated.
2.3.3 Segregation and divorce
Our model implies that a bias in favor of homogamous marriage in the unrestricted pool
has a negative e¤ect on each cultural group’s e¤ort in marriage segregation, because
agents react to the bias by decreasing their e¤ort to enter the restricted pool. Johnson
(1980) …nds higher ‘intrinsic homogamy’ rates in urban environment than in rural envi-
ronments, which is consistent with the implications of our model if urban environments
are characterized by easier intercultural relationships.
When extending the analysis to single parent families and divorce, we expect less
16Even stronger segregation patterns by ethnicity are revealed in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (Borjas, 1995).
18direct socialization e¤ort for single parent families than for homogamous families. This
is consistent with Thomson-McLanahan-Curtin (1992), which …nd weaker control of and
fewer demand placed on children of single parent families (independent of the parent’s
gender). We would also expect a decline in homogamy rates especially starting from the
60s, as a consequence of higher divorce rates (see for example Davis, 1985, for a survey
of the main trends in marriage relationships in the U.S.). This is broadly consistent
with the trends toward cohabitations in the U.S. from the 60s (Spanier, 1985), since, as
we already noted, cohabitations are relatively heterogamous. Also, and more directly,
the average fraction of religiously homogamous marriages in the General Social Survey
sample slowly declines from :9 in the 20s to :83 in the 60s, and then drops to :75 in the
70s (and remains constant in the 80s).
3 The dynamics of the distribution of cultural traits
In the previous sections, we analyzed how marital strategies across cultural communities
are a¤ected by the agents’ concern for transmitting cultural values, assuming the distri-
bution of cultural traits in the population, qi, was exogenously determined. However,
patterns of marital segregations and socialization across cultural groups have e¤ects on
the dynamics of cultural traits in society, or on the dynamics of qi.
Taking the dynamics of cultural traits explicitly into account allows us to ask ques-
tions like: What distribution of traits will prevail in the long-run? Does the population
remain multicultural in the limit, or do we observe a tendency towards cultural homo-
geneity ? What are the e¤ects of various structural changes in institutional arrangements
within marriage ?
In this section we investigate these issues by analyzing the explicit dynamics of cultural
traits in the population, and the dependence of the dynamics on various historical in-
stitutional changes in marriage relationships, like a greater availability of intercultural
relationships (due for instance to urbanization or information technologies); a greater
freedom of choosing ones’ mate; a greater acceptance of divorce, single parent families,
and female labor market participation.
Let us …rst consider the model with a bias in the common pool (° 6= 0) but no divorce
and single parent families (c = 0). The probability that a child with a father with trait
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where ¼i(qi;°) is the equilibrium homogamy rate probability of population i. We note
its dependence in equilibrium on the parameter °. Similarly, the probability that a child












t denote the fraction of the population with trait i at time t (we omit the index
t when not necessary). The dynamics of the population of agents with trait i is then






























This dynamical process has corner stationary states, qi = 0 and qi = 1, and possibly
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The following result states that corner stationary states are unstable, and that there
exists at least one interior locally stable stationary state.
Proposition 3 The corner stationary states, qi = 0 and qi = 1, are locally unstable.
There always exists one interior steady state qi¤, which, under convexity conditions on
cost functions (in the Appendix), is locally stable. 17
The mechanismof marriage and cultural transmission we study generates dynamics of
the distribution of cultural traits which tend to multicultural populations and away from
complete assimilation of minorities. This is because the transmission mechanism has the
property that cultural minorities tend to react in equilibrium to the prospect of cultural
assimilation with marriage segregation, homogamous marriages, and with more intense
strategies for the direct socialization of children. Even though majorities have higher
socialization rates, due simply to the e¤ect of peers and role models, the dynamics of
the distribution of traits in the population, when one traits is close to becoming extinct,
depends essentially on direct socialization e¤ort, which is higher for minorities.18
It is important to stress that such a result depends on the traits not having e¤ects
on the agents’ economic opportunities. This is, of course, an abstraction. The results
of Proposition 3 are most properly interpreted as identifying a form of persistence in
the dynamics of cultural traits, a non-linearity in the degree of cultural assimilation.
Such persistence of traits, and the di¢culty in acculturation of minorities, while hard
to measure and document, is evident in many historical and ethnographic accounts of
the evolution of ethnic and religious traits, as discussed in the Introduction.19 One of
the few econometric attempts at measuring the persistence of cultural traits is Borjas’s
17Multiple interior stationary states might arise. The reason is that while the probability of being
married in the restricted pool, ®i(qi), is a decreasing function of the frequency of the trait in the
population, the probability of being homogamously married, ¼i(qi), may be increasing with qi. As a
consequence equation (8) may have more than one solution in qi¤.
18For an example of how instead peer pressure and social interactions might lead to homogeneity, see
Glaeser-Sacerdote-Scheinkman, 1996.
19The ‘Renaissance’ of Orthodox Jews is one such accounts (Mayer, 1985). It is not just explained
by extreme homogamy rates, but also by relatively high fertility rates. The average number of children
per family of Orthodox Jews in 1990, according to the National Jewish Population Survey, was above
201995 study of the assimilation of immigrants’ ‘ethnic capital’ in the U.S. Consistently
with our results, he …nds quite slow rates of cultural convergence, explained mainly by
neighborhood …xed e¤ects, which we interpret as a proxy for homogamy rates and direct
socialization e¤ort.
How will changes in the marital and social environment a¤ect the long-run distrib-
ution of cultural traits ? We will consider three such changes. First, observe that the
condition for an interior stationary state, equation (8), can be restated as:
qa¤ ¡ HT ab(qa¤;°)






where HTab(qa¤;°) measures the heterogamy of the population in equilibrium at the
stationary state fraction of population with trait a, qa¤. This equation is represented
in Figure 1, where the LL and RR curves represent respectively the left and the right
hand-side of equation (8) as a function of qa¤.
i) Decrease in °; increase in ±. Consider a negative change in °, the distortion towards
homogamy in the unrestricted pool. Typically, urbanization and the development of
communication and transportation technologies should be associated with a negative
change in °; as such structural changes tend to increase and facilitate intercultural con-
tacts. A negative change in ° increases equilibrium marriage segregation, ®i, of both
cultural groups. It generally increases heterogamy, HTab, and it does not a¤ect the so-
cialization e¤ort of homogamous marriages (the RR curve in Figure (1) does not move).
Note that an increase in HTab shifts up (down) the LL curve , to LL0, when qa¤ is larger
(smaller) than
1
2 (see Figure 1). The reason is that an increase in HTab decreases for
both groups the probability ¼i(qi;°) of getting an homogamous marriage. However the
decrease is more pronounced for the minority group than for the majority group, since
random matching in the unrestricted pool favors by de…nition homogamy of the majority
group. As the LL curve represents the ratio of homogamous marriages in group a to
group b, it is then increasing (decreasing) with HT ab when a is the majority (minority)
group (i.e., qa¤ larger (smaller) than 1=2). A reduction in °, though leading in the short
run to higher e¤ort to marital segregation by both groups, generally tends to increase
heterogamy in society, and, as shown in Figure 1, favors in the limit the majority trait




An increase in ±, a measure of the cost of marriage segregation, captures, for instance,
greater freedom in choosing ones’ mate, a relatively recent development in marriage in-
4, as opposed to less than 2 for Conservative and Reform Jews. Our model of socialization, extended
to endogenous fertility, would explain such positive correlation between fertility, homogamy and so-
cialization, since high level of homogamy and socialization are equivalent to high expected ‘quality’ of
children (Bisin-Verdier, 1996). As already noted, higher intended fertility for homogamous couples is
also documented by Lehrer (1996).
21stitutions across many ethnic groups at least in the western world (see e.g., Davis, 1985).
An increase in ± decreases equilibrium marriage segregation, ®i, thereby increasing HT ab,
while it does not a¤ect the socialization e¤ort of homogamous marriages (the RR curve
in Figure ) does not move). An increase in ±, implying an increase in HTab, decreases
for both groups the probability ¼i(qi;°) of getting an homogamous marriage match.
However, as before, the decrease is more pronounced for the minority group than for the
majority group. An increase in ±, then favors the majority trait in the limit (the sta-
tionary state frequency of the majority group, i.e., the group i with qi¤ > 1
2, increases).
ii) Increase in ¯. It is also interesting to consider the impact of changes in the cost of
direct family socialization, ¯. Such changes may be associated with structural changes
in gender roles inside the family, like the increased female participation rate in the la-
bor market. This phenomenon increases the opportunity costs to women of spending
time socializing children inside the family, and therefore, should be associated with a
positive change in the cost of direct cultural socialization. Another historical structural
change moving in the same direction, is the shift from a family-labor based economy
towards a market-wage based economy, making it again more costly for the family to
directly transmit its own cultural trait. Formally, the impact of a less e¢cient socializa-
tion technology, by changing directly family socialization, ¿i(qi), and indirectly marital
segregation strategies, ®i(qi
t), a¤ects both the LL and the RR curves in Figure 1. As it
induces a reduction in the marital segregation strategy, ®i, and in the family socialization
e¤ort, ¿i; the impact on the marriage game is to induce a larger equilibrium heterogamy,
HT ab. As before, this e¤ect decreases the probability of homogamous matching for the
minority group more than for the majority group, hence implying a larger fraction of
agents of the majority group in the long run distribution of the population. However,
there is now in principle another e¤ect emanating from the direct decrease in ¿i stim-
ulated by the parameter’s change. If the increase in socialization costs, ¯, a¤ects the
technology of family socialization in the same way for both groups, the ratio of socializa-
tion e¤orts
¿b(qb)
¿a(qa) is not a¤ected: the RR curve does not shift. The e¤ect of an increase
in the cost of direct family socialization, ¯, is equivalent, then, to a decrease in °: it
increases in the limit the fraction of agents with the majority trait (i.e., qi¤, for the trait
i such that qi¤ >
1
2).
iii) Changes in ¢V i. As in the case of changes in the costs of family socialization, a
change in the perceived cultural distance of group i, ¢V i, with respect to the other group
will a¤ect both the LL and RR curves. For instance, if the minority group (say, group b)
tends to be more tolerant towards the majority group (¢V b decreases), then that group
becomes less homogamous and the equilibrium heterogamy rate HTab consequently in-
creases, meaning an upward shift of LL. At the same time, family socialization ¿b(qb) is
also reduced, implying a downward shift of RR. Both e¤ects tend to increase the frac-
tion of the majority group a, and the ‘cultural assimilation’ of the minority group. An
increase in cultural tolerance of the majority group, group a, similarly increases inter-
marriage between the two communities. On the other hand, it also implies a reduction
22of the intensity of family socialization of that group. The …rst e¤ect positively a¤ects
the long run proportion of the majority group, while the second e¤ect tends, on the
contrary, to favor the minority. The total e¤ect is ambiguous. However, it is easy to
see that when the majority group is large enough (qa¤ close enough to 1), the impact
of a change in ¢V a only marginally a¤ects the socialization e¤ort, ¿a(qa), leaving the
RR curve almost una¤ected. In that case, only the positive impact of a decrease in
¢V a on LL remains, implying an increase in the steady state frequency of the majority
group, and, conversely, a smaller sized minority group. For example, as noted in the
Introduction, American Jews’ faster acculturation since the end of World War II might
be explained by other major religious groups’ increasing tolerance of inter-marriage with
Jews (see Dershowitz, 1997).
Finally, we brie‡y discuss the implications of increasing the probability of divorce, c,
on the long run distribution of cultural traits in the population. The dynamics equation




































In equation (9) we see that the cultural selection forces operate through two socialization
channels. Homogamous couples who have not divorced (in proportion (1 ¡ c)¼a(qt)
and (1 ¡ c)¼b(1 ¡ qt)) socialize their children with direct family socialization e¤ort,
¿i
m(qi
t). Divorced couples and single parent families (in proportion c¼a(qt) and c¼b(1¡qt))
socialize their children with direct family socialization e¤ort ¿i
s(qi
t). Clearly when the
total e¤ective socialization e¤ort of group i (homogamous couples plus single parent
families) is larger than the other group’s, then the frequency of trait i increases in the
population. As we have pointed out in Section 2.3, an increase in c reduces the resources
spent to match in the restricted pools and brings more heterogamy in the short-run. As
homogamy for both cultural groups decreases, homogamy rates also decrease for both
groups, but less rapidly for the majority group than for the minority group. This implies
a bias in the evolution of traits which favors the majority group. At the same time,
an increase in divorce rates increases the importance of single parent socialization in
the dynamics of the distribution of traits. Clearly, it brings an advantage to the group
which is more successful at socializing in single parent contexts. When both groups
are equally successful at socializing their children in single parent family contexts (i.e.,
they have access to the same technologies of socialization), this e¤ect tends to favor the
minority cultural group, as agents of that group have larger incentives to spend resources
for cultural transmission. Hence, it appears that while reducing homogamy the overall
e¤ect of higher divorce rates on preferences is ambiguous. When, however, single parent
families are not able to signi…cantly bias the cultural transmission process, we get some
clearer implications. In this case the term c(¿a
s(q)¡¿b
s(1¡q)) is close to zero in equation
(9). We are therefore left with only the e¤ect of c on the groups’ marital strategies. That
is, an increase in the probability of divorce, c, reduces marital segregation strategies of
23both groups and increases heterogamy. This favors, in the long-run, the cultural trait of
the majority group.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes marital segregation decisions and their impact on the transmission
of ethnic and religious traits. We concentrate on the interaction between direct family
socialization and oblique socialization by teachers, peers and role models. While most re-
search on cultural transmission has stressed this interaction (e.g., Cavalli Sforza-Feldman,
1981, Boyd-Richerson, 1985), we complement this emphasis by modelling marriage and
direct family socialization as economic decisions of agents. This economic approach gen-
erates many interesting restrictions, as well as testable implications, which we attempt
to identify and study in the paper.
Our analysis of socialization is relatively abstract, and, hence, in principle, can be
extended to analyze the evolution of other cultural traits or di¤erent socialization mech-
anisms. However, the assumption that cultural traits are ‘pure’, or do not have relevant
e¤ects on agents’ economic opportunities, is quite restrictive. This assumption needs to
be relaxed in particular to apply our analysis to study the evolution of many interest-
ing cultural traits and preference parameters, like political attitudes, risk aversion, and
intertemporal discounting. Such traits, in fact, a¤ect how agents interact economically
and socially, especially in strategic environments.
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where W i(qi) is given by
W
i(q
i) = max¿i [¿
i + (1 ¡ ¿
i)q
i]V





and V i(qi) = qiV ii + (1 ¡ qi)V ij
We assume:
Assumption A. For i 2 fa;bg, C(±®i) and H(¯¿i) are monotonic increasing, of class





@®i(±) > [Wi(0) ¡ V i(0)];




@®i > 0 at ®i = ®i
max such that ±
@C
@®i(±®i
max) = W i(0) ¡ V i(0):
Assumptions A-1) - A-iii) provide su¢cient conditions for the existence and unique-
ness of the Nash equilibrium in the marriage game. A-i) requires that the marginal
cost of marriage segregation is increasing and concave. A-ii) ensures that matching with
probability 1 in the restricted pool is prohibitively costly. Finally, A-iii) requires that, at
some largest possible restricted pool matching probability, ®i
max; the cost function C(:)
is convex enough.



















(1 ¡ Aj)(1 ¡ qi)
(1 ¡ Ai)qi + (1 ¡ Aj)(1 ¡ qi)
A symmetric Nash equilibrium of the marriage game has the propery that all agents of
type i choose the same ®i, and is represented by mappings ®i(qi) which are …xed points
of the best replies of agents i 2 fa;bg derived from the maximization of equation (10).





(1 ¡ ®j)(1 ¡ qi)





i)] = 0 (12)
25for i;j 2 fa;bg and i 6= j:
Proof of Proposition 1 (under Assumption A). At a symmetric Nash equilibrium
®i = Ai and the …rst order condition of an individual of type i for the choice of ®i is
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because of A-i). Hence ©i is continuous and concave in ®i for any (®j;qi) 2 [0;1]
2.
Also ©i(0;®j;qi) · 0 and ©i(1;®j;qi) > 1, because of A-ii). Hence, for any (®j;qi)
2 [0;1]









(®j;qi) can be viewed as a best response function of the marital
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(1 ¡ ®j)(1 ¡ qi)
(1 ¡ ®i)qi + (1 ¡ ®j)(1 ¡ qi)
d[W i(qi) ¡ V i(qi)]
dqi ;
but W i(qi)¡V i(qi) = ¿i(qi)[V ii ¡V ij](1¡qi)¡H(¿i(qi)). Applying the Envelope The-
orem we have
d[W i(qi)¡V i(qi)]
dqi < 0. Hence
@©i















symmetric Nash equilibrium of the marriage game is a …xed point of this mapping. As








(®a) are continuous functions from [0;1]
into [0;1], -(®a) is also a continuous mapping from [0;1] into [0;1]: Hence the Kaku-
tani Fixed Point Theorem implies the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
marriage game.
To prove uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium it su¢ces to show that
-(®a) ¡ ®a is strictly decreasing in ®a: Continuity of ®i(qi) then follows directly.




























































































































which is satis…ed under Assumption A. More precisely, as
@3C





decreasing in ®i, and is therefore positive for all relevant ®i, since, by condition A-iii),
it is positive for the largest possible ®i, ®i
max, given by ± @C
@®i(±®i
max) = Ki(0).
27The choice of ¿i is derived from the following optimization problem:
W
i(q
i) = max¿i [¿
i + (1 ¡ ¿
i)q
i]V





which is a convex problem under Assumption A. This immediately implies the continuity
of the solution as a function of the parameters, ¿i(qi). }






@®a ¡1 has the
sign of @-






















@qa < 0: Hence the result that ®a(qa) is decreasing in qa. By
a symmetric argument ®b(qb) is decreasing in qb = 1 ¡ qa:








Because of the convexity of H(:), the second order condition is satis…ed and di¤erenti-
ating the previous equation, we get
@¿i
@qi = ¡





The comparative statics results in Section 2.2, and the extensions and the compar-
ative statics analysis of Section 2.2.1, are studied in an Appendix available from the
authors.
We now study the dynamics of the distribution of traits, following the analysis of
Section 3, where ° 6= 0 and c = 0: The general case in which c 6= 0 is studied in the
Appendix available from the authors. The equation for the dynamics of the distribution





































h ) are the transition probabilities for a parent of type i


























Substituting these transition probabilities in equation (13), and subtracting qi
t on both



























28Proof of Proposition 3. Let qi
t denote the fraction of the population with trait i at
time t.
i) From the …rst order conditions of the socialization problem in equation (6), ¿i
m(1) = 0.
Also ¿i

















































The two previous expressions ensure that the corner stationary states qa¤ = 0 and qa¤ = 1
are locally unstable.























By continuity of £(:) there exists an interior point qa¤ 2 (0;1) such that £(qa¤) = 0 and





















































a¤)j < 2 (14)
A su¢cient condition for equation (14) to be satis…ed is: j£0(qa¤)j < 8, which in turn is
satis…ed if @¿i
@qai and @®i
@qai are su¢ciently bounded, i.e., if H(¯¿i) and C(±®i) are convex
enough in ¿i and ®i: }
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